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COMMENTARY

THE PRINCE OF DARKNESS AND THE SHORTNESS
OF MEMORY: HAROLD ROTHWAX'S GUILTY: THE
COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE"
William E. Hellersteint
Harold Rothwax's Guilty: The Collapse of CriminalJustice
is a provocative but dangerous book. Written for general consumption and promoted via a plethora of book signings and
talk show appearances, Guilty gives but one side of the argument to important questions about the American criminal
justice system. It thereby skews the lay reader's perspective by
failing to provide a balance of perspectives. Although Judge
Rothwax raises serious questions about the relationship between truth-seeking and the adversary system and makes
several sensible recommendations, his unbalanced presentation
and his attacks on illusory malefactors do a considerable disservice to the reader. To Judge Rothwax, whose cynicism and
irascibility on the bench have earned him the title "Prince of
Darkness,"2 Supreme Court justices, whose decisions have
protected defendants' rights, and defense attorneys, who insist
on representing their clients effectively, are villains. Singled

*©1996 William E. Hellerstein. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1 In an eloquent and significant 1974 Cardozo lecture at the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, then U.S. District Judge Marvin E. Frankel raised
troublesome issues concerning whether the adversary system undervalues the
search for truth. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An Umpireal View, 30
RECORD OF THE ASSN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 14 (1975). The
views there expressed were more extensively developed in a well-received book.
MARviN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980).
2 See Jan Hoffman, The Transformation of a Judge, N.Y. TM, Feb. 4, 1996,
at 35.
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out for special opprobrium are the judges of the New York
Court of Appeals who have more than occasionally found in the
New York State Constitution broader protections for criminal
defendants than are secured by the federal Constitution:' "As
I sometimes tell my law students," states Judge Rothwax, "the
Court of Appeals is in session, we are all in danger."4 Unfortunately, the book arrived in the midst of the most frenzied attack on judicial independence in recent memory and fueled its
fire.5
Judge Rothwax attacks the exclusionary rule (made applicable to the states by Mapp v. Ohio6 ), Miranda v. Arizona,7
the sixth amendment right to counsel (as construed in Massiah
v. United States8 and Brewer v. Williams'), and the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination (as interpreted in Griffin v. California° to preclude the prosecution from
commenting on the defendant's choice not to testify at trial).
Judge Rothwax's line of fire also includes speedy trial statutes,
pretrial discovery rules which he believes unduly favor the
defense, peremptory challenges, unanimous verdicts and appellate reversals of convictions for "technical" reasons, which he
sees as unrelated to "core values." In short, Judge Rothwax
views the American criminal justice system as one that allows
the citizen, "aided and abetted by the Constitution," to unduly
thwart the prosecution's quest for the truth."

' See Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of
Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 157 (1979);
Daniel C. Kramer & Robert Riga, The New York Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court, 1960-76, 8 PUBLIUS 75 (1978). For an extensive critical
analysis of the Court of Appeals' search and seizure decisions under the New York
State Constitution, see Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1996).
4 HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31 (1996)

[hereinafter GUILTY].
' See, e.g., Mark Green, When Politicians Judge the Judges, N.Y. L.J., May 6,
1996, at 2; Anthony Lewis, Where Would You Hide?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at
A15; Don Van Natta, Jr., Doubting Harolds: Looking Inside a Judge's Mind, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at 3.
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
10 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

" GUILTY, supra note 4, at 132.
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Judge Rothwax has aimed much of his argument at false
targets. Even if his analysis of some key cases is correct,'2 the
cases themselves are not perceived by a significant segment of
the law enforcement establishment as serious impediments to
the functioning of the criminal justice system. Although the
system has serious deficiencies, cases such as Mapp, Miranda,
Massiah, Brewer and Griffin are not viruses that plague it.
Judge Rothwax may be in the right church, but he is in the
wrong pew.
What ails the criminal justice system are its inexorable
volume and the persistent lack of resolve in the body politic to
allot adequate resources to cope with it. Judge Rothwax understands this, as his defense of plea bargaining attests. 3 Nonetheless, he looks elsewhere for those factors which, in his estimation, have brought the criminal justice system into disrepute. He finds them primarily in the Bill of Rights-especially
as construed by the Warren Court-the adversary system, and
the defense bar in particular. Thus, he would scuttle many of
the protections we have been given, reduce the role of defense
counsel who represent "guilty" defendants to that of the proverbial potted plant, and have the American people look to
England and Europe because, in his estimation, they outshine
us in the search for truth.'4
Judge Rothwax acknowledges that he has been influenced
heavily by certain academic writers, such as Professors Joseph
D. Grano, Craig M. Bradley and Gerald M. Caplan, who are
among the staunchest critics of the Warren Courtes criminal
law rulings. He makes no effort, however, to present the views
of respected scholars who are equally articulate in their defense of the Warren Court, foremost of whom is Yale Kamisar,
who the Supreme Court has cited and quoted more frequently

But see infra note 18.
13 GUILTY, supra note 4, at 143-66.
14

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 235.
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than any other scholar in the field. 5 A more balanced use of
scholarly legal sources would have served both the author and
the public better.
Judge Rothwax's grievances against the exclusionary rule
for illegal searches and seizures are that its benefits "in protecting the privacy of the citizen are greatly outweighed by its
burden on the truth-seeking process and [outweighed] by reduced crime control," 6 that "the legal doctrines the rule enforces are so complicated and tangled that the police (and even
judges themselves) cannot determine in advance what a majority of the Supreme
Court will find," 7 and that the rule is
" 18
"mandatory.

15 Faculty Notes, 39 U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 1, 10 (1966). All that
Judge Rothwax tells us about Professor Kamisar is that "he wrote a piece some
years ago in which he said he found it incomprehensible that the Constitution
could require so much protection for the defendant in the 'mansion' of the courtroom and so little in the 'gatehouse' of the police station." GUILTY, supra note 4,
at 80.
16
'7

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 62.
GUILTY, supra note 4, at 64.

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 64. Judge Rothwax begins his attack with the
accusation that Mapp was an "impulsive" decision because Mapp's own attorney
did not even raise the issue of whether Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
should be overruled. Next, he singles out, as a decision which "makes [him)
ashamed," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), which held that a
search warrant issued by the State Attorney General pursuant to a state statute
was unlawful. GUILTY, supra note 4, at 39.
That the Court reached out in Mapp to decide the issue is of little interest.
Given the number of cases that involve illegal searches and seizures, it was only a
question of time before the Court decided that the exclusionary rule should apply
to the states. In fact, in Mapp, Justice Clark noted specifically that term after
term since Wolf, the Court had been asked repeatedly to overrule Wolf. 367 U.S.
643, 654 (1961). He also thought it significant that after Wolf, more states had
adopted an exclusionary rule than had rejected it. Id. at 651. What Judge
Rothwax does not address is the fervor with which many years earlier a conservative Justice Day embraced the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).

As to Coolidge, Judge Rothwax erroneously assesses the case as one in which
the defendant goes free because "the constable blundered." The constable did not
blunder; the New Hampshire legislature did by authorizing the Attorney General,
the state's chief law enforcement officer, rather than an impartial magistrate, to
issue search warrants. As the Coolidge majority pointed out, the Fourth Amendment contemplates the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate in the
assessment of probable cause. 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (citing Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
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Of course, these criticisms are not new. The exclusionary
rule's efficacy in protecting privacy has been long debated, and
deterrence-principle scholarship is extensive.' Unquestionably, Judge Rothwax has cast his lot with those who believe
that the rule does not deter and that it is not cost-effective, as
if that were its only value. However, he does not afford the
reader the slightest glimpse of the substantial literature which
disputes those claims. Most importantly, he also has apparently forgotten the course of events that led the Court to decide
Mapp as it did. And if he has not forgotten, he mistakenly
perceives that if the exclusionary rule were abolished, there
would be no significant increase of illegal searches and seizures by the police.
In any discussion of the exclusionary rule, it is important
to remember that it is the Fourth Amendment itself and not
the exclusionary rule that cabins police conduct. Indeed, if the
police abided by the amendment's proscriptions, the
exclusionary rule would be superfluous. The issue thus narrows to whether exclusion is an appropriate remedy to secure
the amendment's protections. Judge Rothwax concedes that to
protect fourth amendment rights, there is a need for effective
remedies. However, he concludes that "the hope that the
exclusionary rule would be that 'effective remedy' has never
been realized." 0 This misses the point; the issue is not whether the exclusionary rule provides a perfect or near perfect deterrent, but whether it is the best of the remedial lot. It is.
The Mapp plurality itself recognized that no other remedy
was efficacious; police departments did not discipline their
transgressing members and tort remedies were fanciful." Nor
" See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMIL PROCEDURE 902
n.101 (3d ed. 1995).
2o GUILTY, supra note 4, at 49-50.
21 Six years earlier the California Supreme Court in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d
905 (Cal. 1955), adopted the exclusionary rule because it too believed that no
effective alternative existed and that it was unlikely that one ever would. See
Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuE LJ.319,
324. The Mapp Court's assessment of the effectiveness of nonexclusionary remedies
has proven accurate. A 1986 Justice Department report observed that since 1971
plaintiffs had filed approximately 12,000 Biuens actions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing direct cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment). In only five cases had damages been paid to the
plaintiffs. With respect to suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
there were 'fewer than three dozen reported fourth amendment cases over the
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can it be said that in the thirty-five years since Mapp, the
exclusionary rule has not significantly affected police behavior.2 Apart from the deterrence principle, the Court's decisions have had an educative effect on the police.' On the other hand, elimination of the exclusionary rule would return
police behavior to a level of permissiveness not seen since
before Mapp. In a 1980 study, based on many interviews with
police commanders from all levels and with students training
to be police officers, Professor Milton A. Loewenthal of the
John Jay College of Criminal Justice concluded that
[there is] strong evidence that, regardless of the effectiveness of
direct sanctions, police officers could neither understand nor respect
a Court which purported to impose constitutional standards on the
police without excluding evidence obtained in violation of those standards.
Most police officers interpret the Wolf case as not having imposed any legal obligation on the police since, under that decision,
the evidence would still be admissible no matter how it was obtained.
No matter what sanctions may be imposed in its stead, police
officers are bound to view the elimination of the exclusionary rule as
an indication that the fourth amendment is not a serious matter, if
indeed it applies to them at all.

past 20 years." Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Just., Report to the Attorney
General on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERIES, REPORT NO. 2 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573, 630 (1989).
As to internal discipline, only seven investigations into fourth amendment violations by federal agents were conducted since 1981. Id.
' Even the exclusionary rule's strongest skeptics have acknowledged that specific deterrence instances have occurred. See, e.g., J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 86-87 (1979) (Police responded more often than not that "exclusion of illegally seized evidence in court proceedings discourages police officers
from making many kinds of searches they would otherwise make."); Dallin H.
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665, 710 (1970) (describing police officers who care that evidence has been lost).
For arguments and specifics as to general and "systemic" deterrence, see William
J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981).
"3 See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 22 (citing FRANKLIN E. ZIMIUNG &
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 77-83
(1973)).
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Since the rule has become functionally identified with the
fourth amendment, the removal of the rule is likely to be interpreted
as an implicit condoning of violations of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, no matter what substitute remedies may be applied."

Entwined with Judge Rothwax's skepticism about deterrence is his belief that "[plolice officers do not have the time,
inclination, or training to read and understand the nuances of

appellate decisions that define standards of conduct.'s This
too is not an argument against the exclusionary rule. Rather,

it is an argument against the substance of the Fourth Amendment itself. The complexity-if it is complexity-of search and
seizure law results from the myriad factual permutations that
arise from the multiplicity of police-citizen encounters. Responding to a similar assertion by Professor Grano, Professor
Kamisar has pointed out that Grano
is confusing the content of the law of search and seizure with the
remedy if that body of law is violated.
If the law of search and seizure is unrelated to the Fourth
Amendments essential role, the fault lies with the courts that have
misinterpreted the fourth amendment, not with the exclusionary
rule. If the law of search and seizure is too intricate or rigid, abolishing the exclusionary rule would not lilt the restrictions or eliminate the intricacies. Only a change in the substantive law of search
and seizure can do that. 6

Lastly, Judge Rothwax argues that if it is necessary to
have an exclusionary rule, it should be a nonmandatory one.'
However, to make the exclusionary rule nonmandatory would
import the concept of proportionality into the law of search and
seizure because it would measure the nature of the intrusion
into an individual's privacy against the seriousness of the of-

24 Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV. 24, 29-30 (1980) (quoted in Yale Kamisar, Remembering
the 'Old World" of Criminal Procedure:A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 MiCu. J.L.

REF. 537, 566-67 (1990)). Professor Daniel J. Meltzer suggests that one reason why
so many academic commentators reject the deterrent theory is 'that the Burger

Court has relied upon the deterrent theory to justify cutbacks in the exclusionary
rule that seem quite dubious, even when considered on their own 'deterrent!
terms." Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Low Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLuM.. L.
REv. 247, 272 (1988).
GUILTY, supra note 4, at 63.
26 Kamisar, supra note 24, at 557.
GUILTY, supra note 4, at 64-65.
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fense. But such a sliding scale approach not only would fail to
protect a person's privacy because a breach of it is complete
when the police have acted, it would afford the police no greater certainty as, to what is permissible conduct under the
Fourth Amendment. Functionally, a sliding scale would be
little more than an expanded category of "exigent circumstances" that, as it currently exists, affords the police more than
ample scope
to deal with the need to investigate serious crimes
28
quickly.

As we approach the twenty-first century, whether Judge
Rothwax and his academic mentors are correct as to their view
of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule is largely beside the
point. Our nation has lived with it in the federal system for
eighty-four years, and states that, prior to Mapp, had not established one of their own have now coped with it for thirtyfive years. There is no conclusive evidence that the rule's operation significantly impedes crime control. Indeed, many studies
have indicated that it does not.29 Perhaps it is best to leave
the subject with the late Professor John Kaplan's observation:
From a public relations perspective, it is the worst possible kind of
rule because it only works at the behest of a person, usually someone who is clearly guilty, who is attempting to prevent the use
against himself of evidence of his own crimes .... If there were
some way to make the police obey, in advance, the commands of the

See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)); see also United States v. MacDonald,
916 F.2d 766, 777 (2d Cir. 1990) (Kearse, J., dissenting) ("After this decision there
appears to be little left of the warrant requirement in narcotics cases."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
2 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need
to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other
Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611. Davies observed that
the "most striking feature of the data is the concentration of illegal searches in
drug arrests (and possibly weapons possession arrests) and the extremely small
effects in arrests for other offenses, including violent crimes." Id. at 680. Thus, he
concluded that "available empirical evidence casts considerable doubt on both the
alleged 'high costs' of the exclusionary rule and the purported prevalence of 'legal
technicalities' as the cause of illegal searches." Id.; see Peter F. Nardulli, The Soci.
etal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 585. Nardulli reported that an empirical study of almost 7500 cases of
criminal courts in nine counties in Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania disclosed
that "none of the motions [to suppress evidence] granted in offenses against persons involved exceptionally serious cases such as murder, rape, armed robbery, or
even unarmed robbery. The motions granted were in indecent exposure, simple
battery, and aggravated assault cases." Id. at 596 n.47.
28
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Fourth Amendment, we would lose at least as many criminal convictions as we do today, but in that case we would not know of the
evidence which the police could discover only through a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. It is possible that the real problem with the
exclusionary rule is that it flaunts before us the price we pay for the
Fourth Amendment."

In calling for the overruling of Miranda, Judge Rothwax
alludes only to the writings of the anti-Mirandaacademicians,
Professors Grano,3 Caplan32 and Bradley.' As a result, his
discussion of Miranda is as one-sided as his discussion of the
exclusionary rule. He argues that Miranda "is not a wise or
necessary decision-nor a harmless one," and that it "has sent
our jurisprudence on a hazardous detour." He asserts further that Miranda "manifests the least regard for truth-seeking"; that it "was decided at a time when effective alternatives
for restraining unlawful police conduct were ripe for implementation but were subsequently never pursued"; and that
"Miranda'srigidity has led to judicial chaos. ' He assures us
that "there is no reason to fear that overruling Mirandawill
return us to the Dark Ages of police abuse. As long as we are
firm in our judicial commitment to freedom and the protection
of citizen's
rights, we will achieve results that are honest and
36
fair."
Some of us are not quite as sanguine. Judge Rothwax either has forgotten, or he no longer considers it important, to
recall why the Court decided Miranda when it did. Miranda
was nothing if not the logical culmination of the Court's long
and constant exposure to coercive police behavior in custodial
settings. Much of this behavior was visited upon racial and
ethnic minorities, especially in the South.' It is impossible,
therefore, to separate the Warren Court's criminal procedure
revolution, of which Mirandawas the lodestar, from the broad-

'1

JOHN KAPLAN, CRIMNAL JUSTICE 215-16 (2d ed. 1978).
See, eg., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUT AND THE LAW (1993).

Gerald M. Kaplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985).
CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRMNAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION
(1993).
" GUILTY, supra note 4, at 86.

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 86.
36

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 87.

"Herbert

L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIML

L., CRIMNOLOGY & POLICE SCL 238, 240 (1966).
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er civil rights struggles of the 1960s.3" The Court simply despaired of its institutional inability (and that of lower courts as

well) through case-by-case voluntariness rulings to affect abusive police behavior in the custodial context. 9 Although many
feared that the Court would interdict all questioning of suspects by extending the sixth amendment rationale of Escobedo
v. Illinois,0 that fear was not realized. As Yale Kamisar has
pointed out, "the Court did not flatly prohibit police questioning of suspects. Nor did it condition such questioning on the
presence of counsel. Nor did it require that a suspect be advised
of his rights by a defense lawyer or by a disinterested magistrate."' Miranda thus was a compromise between the "totality of circumstances" test then used to determine the
voluntariness of confessions and more extreme proposals that
would prohibit all police interrogation of suspects.2 The debate as to the legitimacy of Mirandaremains with us, and the
lineup of able scholars on both sides of the issue is formidable.4" However, the correctness of each side's argument cannot
be resolved here. It suffices to point out that Judge Rothwax
makes no effort to present both sides of the controversy. By
merely signing on to the anti-Mirandaschool, he again shortchanges his audience, most of whom will never explore the
scholarship that is favorable to Miranda.
More disturbing than the doctrinal one-sidedness of Judge
Rothwax's Mirandadiscussion is the implication that Miranda
constitutes a serious impediment to law enforcement, which is
not necessarily what the data shows. In 1986, Professor Welsh

" See A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 249, 256 (1968).
"' See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 683 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"' Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L. REV. 1, 11 (1995).

42 Id. Professor Kamisar reminds us that the current Court accepts that
Miranda sought to reconcile two "competing concerns"-"the need for police questioning as an effective law enforcement tool and the need to protect custodial
suspects from impermissible coercion." Id. (citing Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
See, e.g., Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938 (1987);
Office of Legal Policy, supra note 21; Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment
at Justice:A Reply, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 950 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987).
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S. White observed that "[tihe great weight of empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact on the
police's ability to obtain confessions has not been significant."' A recent study, although calling for more and better
empirical evidence, concluded nonetheless that "[the available
data thus seem[s] to demonstrate that more suspects invoke
their right to remain silent, and the rate of confessions is
roughly the same."45
On the other hand, Professor Paul G. Cassell argues that
despite the "conventional academic wisdom" to the contrary,
"Mirandahas significantly harmed law enforcement efforts in
this country."" Cassell maintains that Miranda's effects
"should be measured not by looking at suppression motions
filed after police have obtained a confession, but rather by
examining how many confessions police never obtain because
7 Under that analysis, according to Cassell, "the
of Miranda."4
existing empirical data supports the tentative estimate that
Miranda has led to lost cases against almost four percent
(3.8%) of all criminal suspects in this country who are questioned."" Professor Schulhofer has disputed Cassell's analysis, stating that "the properly adjusted attrition rate is not
3.8% but at most only 0.78%."49 In fact, Schulhofer argues,
even this adjusted figure "still substantially overstates
Miranda's current effect." 0 Cassell. replies that his data
shows that "over the long haul, law enforcement never recov5 ' Despite this deered from the blow inflicted by Miranda."
bate in the academy, Judge Rothwax concludes that Miranda
is not "harmless."52 However, he neither supports his claim
,Welsh S.White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAMD.
L. REV. 1, 18 n.99 (1986).
" George C. Thomas I, Dialogue on Miranda. Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Euidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821, 832
(1996).
" Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 387, 390 (1996).
47 Id- at 391.
4 Id. at 438.
41 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 502 (1996).
"Id. at 546.
11 Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Mirandads
Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084, 1091 (1996).
2 GUILTY, supra note 4, at 86.
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with data, nor does he even intimate that respectable scholarship differs on the question. More fundamentally, despite the
periodic energization over Miranda within the academic community, the law enforcement community does not appear preoccupied with the case. 3
As to Judge Rothwax's complaint that Miranda does not
aid the truth-seeking function, he once again ignores the underlying constitutional principle at stake. In this instance, it is
the privilege against self-incrimination in the custodial setting
which the Miranda Court recognized. However, the privilege
was not adopted to facilitate the quest for truth in criminal
prosecutions. As Dean Erwin N. Griswold observed, the emergence of the privilege is "one of the great landmarks in man's
struggle to make himself civilized";' it is "an expression of
the moral striving of the community"55 and "a firm reminder
of the importance of the individual."" The Miranda Court
sought to secure the sanctity of the privilege in the venue
where, in modern times, the Court concluded the privilege was
at risk.57 The inadequacy of the case-by-case voluntariness
quest, it believed, left it little choice. If the Court perceived
correctly that the values embodied by the privilege were imperiled in custodial settings, then criticism of Mirandaimplicates
those values. And, as with much else in criminal procedure,
there are as many arguments against the privilege as there

" Indeed, Professor Kamisar has suggested that "[o]verruling Miranda seems to
be an idea whose time has come and gone." He points out that various studies
and surveys establish that law enforcement officials-prosecutors, judges and police
officers--do not view Miranda as a barrier to effective law enforcement. See
Kamisar, supra note 41, at 24, 25; see also Schulhofer, supra note 49, at 546-47
("[Tihe great weight of the evidence confirms that police have now adjusted to the
Miranda requirements and overcome the limited difficulties experienced in the
immediate post-Miranda period.").
54 ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
" Id. at 73.

:r Id. at 76.
7T See LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
THE RIGHT AGAINST

SELF-INCRIMINATION 427 (1968) (arguing that the Framers' inclusion of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment, rather than in the Sixth, which secures post-indictment procedural rights, proves that the privilege was meant to apply to witnesses
and to all stages of the criminal process). But see LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE
AmEND THE FIFRH AMENDMENT 178-92 (1959) (arguing that the language of the
earliest state and federal provisions evinced the Framers' intent not to
constitutionalize the witness' privilege).
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are for it. Insofar as he believes that the court erred terribly in
protecting the privilege in the station house, Judge Rothwax
has earned a niche in the "privilege-lite" school.
The antipathy that Judge Rothwax harbors for Mirandais
no less fervent when it comes to a suspect's pretrial right to
counsel. He bemoans the decisions in Massiah,' Brewer,'
United States v. Henry' and Maine v. Moulton,6 1 in which
the Court determined that the commencement of adversary
judicial proceedings is a significant event-one that alters the
government's access to a defendant for criminal investigation
purposes in the absence of his or her counsel. Judge Rothwax
thinks even less of the right to counsel jurisprudence of the
New York Court of Appeals, a court that prides itself on affording people greater protection under the right to counsel provision of the New York State Constitution than the Supreme
Court does under the Sixth Amendment.' Judge Rothwax argues that once a defendant has been provided with and confers
with counsel (and may well have been told by counsel not to
talk to the police), "there is simply no constitutional prohibition against the use of incriminating information voluntarily
obtained from an accused despite the fact that his attorney
may not be present."' If truth-seeking is the only legitimate
value at issue, this argument would have some force. Yet is
there nothing to be said for the rationale of Massiah and its
progeny; that once a person is formally charged, and the right
to counsel has attached, fair dealing requires that the government not engage in an end-run around the defendant's attorney? There is more at stake here than mere formalism; a

' Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
"' Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
60 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
6' 474 U.S. 159 (1985).

1 Judge Rothwax erroneously attributes the Court of Appeals' 'absurdly broad
definition of the right to counsel" to 'decades of generous interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment." GUILTY, supra note 4, at 91. He fails to appreciate that the
Court of Appeals has found steadfastly (and before the Supreme Court decided its
major Sixth Amendment cases) in article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution, an independent juridical base for a liberal application of the right to counsel.
See, e.g., People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841
(1963); People v. DiBiase, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
' GUILTY, supra note 4, at 93-94.
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defendant's right to counsel should not be eviscerated by exploitation through direct, and frequently surreptitious, approaches to the defendant in his or her counsel's absence.'
For Judge Rothwax, the less than niggardly approaches to
the right to counsel by both the Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals are condemnable as impediments to
truth. He yearns for the old days as he remembers them, when
"our criminal justice system was relatively simple: A person
was arrested, indicted, and tried."" If those days were "simple," they were not necessarily reflective of a democracy's commitment to fair procedure and equal protection of the laws.
The "simplicity" of the pre-Warren Court era was largely attributable to the reality that for most people the criminal process was a relatively one-sided affair. Indigent defendants, who
have always made up the overwhelming bulk of the defendant
population, did not always have the bedrock protections of the
right to counsel in all felony prosecutions, 6 the right to a trial
transcript67 or counsel for purposes of appeal,68 the right to a
speedy trial,69 and numerous other protections in the Bill of
Rights. Even today, particularly in capital cases, the lack of
competent counsel for indigent defendants is a national disgrace.7" And yet Judge Rothwax somehow believes that overruling cases such as Mirandawould not return us to the "Dark
Ages."7' Nowhere in Guilty, however, is there a discussion of
the considerable number of innocent persons who have been

To the extent that such an approach is part of an ongoing investigation into
other crimes, Massiah, Henry and Moulton do not impede the government from
using a defendant's statements in prosecutions for those crimes; the government
simply may not use those statements, if deliberately elicited, in the prosecution of
the indictment to which the right to counsel has already attached. Given the value
we place upon the sixth amendment right to counsel, this compromise may strike
some as not unreasonable.
65 GUILTY, supra note 4, at 24.

See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
"

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).

'0 See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence

Not for the Worst Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
"1 GUILTY, supra note 4, at 87.
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convicted erroneously72 as the result of police and prosecutorial overreaching in custodial and other investigative settings.'
Judge Rothwax is at his best when pointing out the sorry
state of New Yorks speedy trial jurisprudence. Accepting that
"the idea of a speedy trial is a good one," 74 he rightly reminds
us that current speedy trial rules "do not govern the time within which a trial must commence. They deal only with the subject of when the People must be ready for trial. The fact that
the People are ready to proceed does not mean the trial is at
hand."7 5 Accurately, he observes that "this does not take into
account the terrible congestion that afflicts our courts," 6 and
he is on firm ground when he states that "our government has
chosen to tunnel its vision and resolve the matter with a rigid
set of rules that often doesn't lead to a just result."'
However, Judge Rothwax offers no real solution to the
speedy trial dilemma. Although he correctly notes that all that
we now have is a "prosecutorial readiness" rule, 78 he proposes
that "we begin by cancelling mandatory time periods in favor
of evaluation on a case-by-case basis.""9 He would then require that to establish a denial of a speedy trial, a defendant
should have to "demonstrate that he had at least some interest
in a speedy trial in the first place. "s'
A return to case-by-case adjudication of speedy trial claims
would set matters back to where they were thirty years ago.
What Judge Rothwax has forgotten is that the entire movement to mandatory standards on both federal and state levels
was a reaction to the unsatisfactory nature of the ad hoc adjudication experience. Concern was widespread about the lack of

72

See, e.g., DONALD S. CONNERY, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (1977);

MICHAEL RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992); MARTIN YAr, PRESUMED GUILTY (1991); THE DEATH PENALTY IN ADEmRICA (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d
ed. 1982).
See, e.g., Richard Jerome, Suspect Confessions, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 13,
1995, at 28; ProsecutorsAre Faulted in Dallas Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1989, at A9; Use of Jailhouse Informers Reviewed in L.A., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1989, at A14.
7' GUILTY, supra note 4, at 113.
7' GUILTY, supra note 4, at 112.
7' GUILTY, supra note 4, at 113.
GUILTY, supra note 4, at 113.
7B N.Y. CRIML PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1992).
7' GUILTY, supra note 4, at 120.
GUILTY, supra note 4, at 120.
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clarity as to what constituted a speedy trial violation, and the
vagaries of speedy trial jurisprudence made it relatively easy
for courts to disregard violations of the speedy trial right, especially when serious crimes were at issue.8 New York's adoption of a prosecutorial readiness rule was a compromise between a temporal standard that is mandatory-but still does
not account for court congestion-and the unsatisfactory product of a case-by-case process of adjudication. Although a readiness rule is far from optimal, at least it provides a structural
framework within which the speedy trial guarantee can be
given more meaning. That some judicial decisions have
reached unreasonable results is unfortunate, but no more so
than in other areas of the law. Courts can and should decide
statutory speedy trial claims sensibly. That they fall short at
times does not counsel abandonment of an attempt to improve
upon what was an even less desirable state of affairs.
Judge Rothwax's views about speedy trial requirements
are undoubtedly driven by his belief that "most defendants and
defense attorneys don't want a speedy trial."82 Thus, he allows
his cynicism to denigrate the constitutional right to a speedy
trial. He has forgotten that rights under the Constitution are
individual rights,' and he overlooks the significant number of
defendants who are unable to post bail and who do want a
speedy trial, especially those who are innocent and thus urgently desire and need a prompt resolution of their predicament. The value of a constitutional right is not and should not
be measured by the number of people who claim it.
New York's legislative efforts to buttress the constitutional
right to a speedy trial, undertaken a quarter of a century ago,
are commendable, and Judge Rothwax does not make the case
for their abandonment. Even though New York is neither
ready nor willing to tie the right to a speedy trial to a specified

In 1971, the Second Circuit attempted to bring some order to this chaotic
state of affairs by inviting members of the New York Bar and other interested
parties to present their views on the speedy trial issue in the hope that the Court
would be able to fashion a general rule. Despite the plethora of briefs amici curiae
that were filed, the Court still found itself unable to arrive at a decision of any
general applicability. United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d
Cir. 1971).
82 GUILTY, supra note 4, at 114.
'. See, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
81
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time period irrespective of court congestion, its prosecutorial
readiness rule is preferable to the free form of case-by-case
adjudication that antedated its enactment.
The most distressing chapter of Guilty is entitled "The
Theater of the Absurd-Anything Goes in the Modern American Courtroom."' It is here that Judge Rothwax reveals his
deep distaste for the American criminal defense lawyer, a
distaste that is counter-matched by his deep affection for, and
abiding faith in, the American prosecutor. According to Judge
Rothwax, it is the defense attorney for whom "the temptation
to be overzealous can be very great."' Because Judge
Rothwax estimates that "about 90 percent of the people who go
to trial in this country are guilty,"' he notes that defense
lawyers are put "in a situation where they're constantly representing guilty people." 7 From this fact, he concludes that defense attorneys are prone to "push the envelope."' Not so
with the prosecutor, says Judge Rothwax. "Why," he asks,
"would prosecutors [in a volume-laden system] undertake to
charge persons whom they did not believe were probably guilty
and then assume the burden of proving the charges?'
How do we answer such a question? Do we cite the volumes written on convicting the innocent? Do we cull recent
news stories of wrongful convictions? Do we ignore the numerous abuses of the prosecutorial office for political gain? Do we
shy away from our history of racial discrimination in the
charging process? Do we overlook the consequences of erroneous identifications or sloppy police investigations? Should judges ignore what they know as men and women?
For Judge Rothwax, unlike a defense attorney, a
prosecutor's life is "a constant call to accountability." He asserts that "[elvery time a prosecutor makes a mistake and the
defendant is convicted, the case may be called up on appeal.
Too often, the appellate court, the arbiter of courtroom rules,
reverses convictions based on a small mistake or a technical

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 121.
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error."9 ' To Judge Rothwax, "That's accountability!"92 Statements like these cause this reader to wonder whether Judge
Rothwax is as perceptive as he is given credit for being. Clearly, he ignores the fact that appellate courts bend over backwards to avoid reversing convictions, especially through their
generous application of the harmless error doctrine.93
Judge Rothwax also does not tell us the type of prosecutorial misconduct he considers a "small mistake" or "technical
error." Thus, we do not know whether he would consider a
prosecutor's appeal to racial prejudice or a prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of his or her witnesses a serious or a
trivial error. Nor does he tell us that courts in their decisions
generally do not publish the name of the prosecutor whose
conduct has been deemed unacceptable, a practice that shields
an errant prosecutor from the deterrent effects of professional
opprobrium. Nor does he tell us that prosecutors who violate
defendants' rights are regularly subjected to internal discipline
by their superiors-because they aren't and he can't."
The essence of Judge Rothwax's thesis is that the adversary system is "out of control," and that "perhaps the best
place to start [looking for a cure] is with a serious reevaluation
of the role of the defense attorney."" Coming from a jurist
who believes that our liberties are better safeguarded by the
good offices of the prosecutor rather than by defense attorneys
who "don't argue innocence, they argue reasonable doubt,"96
this is not startling. But the implication is clear: Once a defense attorney concludes that his or her client is guilty, counsel
should do little or nothing at all. Judge Rothwax never quite
says it so baldly; instead, he suggests that it is improper for a
defense attorney to cross-examine an adverse witness who the

91 GUILTY, supra note 4, at 130.

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 130.

See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71
J. GRIM. L. & CRIzuNOLOGY 421 (1980); Stephen Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless
Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error,,88 COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988).
" See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecuting Prosecutors, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 1996,

at 2 ("The American justice system has been extremely tolerant of prosecutors who
misbehave.").
g GUILTY, supra note 4, at 139.
"

GUILTY, supra note 4, at 134.
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attorney "knows" is telling the truth.' He also bemoans that
"when the defendant is guilty [which for Judge Rothwax is
almost always], the defense attorney's role is to prevent, distort, and mislead." 8 Others might say "test." Judge Rothwax
also condemns defense attorneys for "seeding the record" with
error so that a reversal may be obtained later.' Some of us
would call this "protecting the record." When one adds it up,
there is no camouflaging the reality of Judge Rothwaes vision-that for the defense attorney who knows his or her client
is guilty, either serve as little more than an adornment or face
extinction.
Apart from the general factors that have shaped Judge
Rothwax's negative perspectives of the criminal justice system,
the trial of O.J. Simpson unquestionably has exacerbated his
cynicism. For him, the Simpson trial is not aberrational; it is,
he states, "a sterling example of everything that is wrong with
our criminal justice system rolled into one spectacular
event."' For numerous reasons, however, the Simpson trial
is an extremely poor paradigm of the everyday criminal trial.
It was excessive in so many ways, and much of the blame for
its excesses can be traced to Judge Ito's management of the
trial. In this regard, Judge Rothwax himself acknowledges that
"[jiudges get the lawyers they deserve. If they tolerate misconduct they have it in abundance. If they don't run their courtroom, then the lawyers will-with all the chaos that implies."'0
Would Judge Rothwax, the "Prince of Darkness," have conducted the Simpson trial as did Judge Ito? Few who know
Judge Rothwax would suggest such a thing. However, what
Judge Rothwax fails to recognize is that it is equally true that
lawyers get the judges they deserve. The loss of dignity in the
trial process that he imputes to defense lawyers frequently can
be laid at the feet of the trial judge. When that is the case, it is
the defense attorney who must struggle to preserve the dignity
of the proceedings. There can be no quarrel with Judge
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Rothwax's call for greater dignity, but the judge is no less
responsible for its maintenance than are the advocates in the
well.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Simpson trial
has significantly affected Judge Rothwax's perspective. Several
of his recommendations, such as limiting peremptory challenges and the elimination of unanimous verdicts, became hot topics in the immediate aftermath of the trial and have gained adherents as the result of widespread dismay about the Simpson
acquittal. In addition, Judge Rothwax's ad hominem attack on
Peter Neufeld, one of Simpson's lawyers, whose obligations to
Simpson's trial conflicted with his scheduled appearance in
0 2 First,
Judge Rothwax's courtroom, is especially troubling.!
because the attack on Neufeld is irrelevant to the book's purpose, it displays a surprising pettiness. Second, and more significantly, Judge Rothwax's disproportionate discussion of his
encounter with Neufeld suggests that his grievances about the
defense function may be driven as much by emotion as by
reason.
Because the defense lawyer's role in the adversary process
drives Judge Rothwax to distraction, he proposes that we look
for new ideas to some aspects of current procedures in Great
Britain and to continental European systems, where magistrates are more active than American judges in the pursuit of
truth, and the defense attorney's role is more muted. Undoubtedly, there are aspects of other systems that are worthy of
examination. But, again, Judge Rothwax has not made the
case for doing so. He has singled out subjects that are no longer of great concern. He has selected individual absurdities
that are unrepresentative of the system. Most importantly, he
has accepted as an article of faith the idea that in the criminal
justice system, prosecutors and judges are the best ensurers of
fairness. Defense attorneys are not included in his fairness
universe. Nor are constitutionally based rulings that require

02 Nine of twenty-one pages in the chapter criticizing the function of the American defense attorney are devoted to Judge Rothwax's contretemps with Neufeld in
the Pedro Gil case. See GUILTY, supra note 4, at 121-29.
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the government to turn square corners." In short, he has
forgotten where we have been and the why of how we got
there. If Judge Rothwaxs way is the wave of the future, there
should be widespread alarm about where we are going.

The editor's note at the end of Guilty states that Judge
Rothwax "has been a trial judge in the New York State Supreme Court for over twenty-five years, prior to which he was
a defense attorney and card-carrying member of the ACLU."

One wonders if this point was intended to credit Judge
Rothwax's qualifications as a critic of the constitutional foundations of our criminal justice system, or to suggest the great
distance that he has traveled from his pre-judicial career. Perhaps it was meant to do both. Clearly, Judge Rothwax is wellqualified to critique the system's faults. However, it is also
evident that he has changed a great deal from his defense
counsel and ACLU days. Indeed, for such a lawyer to acquire,
as a judge, the title Prince of Darkness takes work. That is
why Guilty, although provocative, is a sad book. It resonates
with a convert's zeal and with the cynical grumblings of a
judge who "feel[s] as though [he has] seen it all,"'' a tired
cynicism that does not serve the judicial office well.

103Justice Holmes once stated that "men must turn square comers when they

deal with the government- Rock Island, Ark & La. Ry. v. United States, 254 U.S.
141, 143 (1920). I have always believed that that admonition applies with equal
force to the government when it deals with individuals.
"I GUILTY, supra note 4, at 22.

